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█ Abstract Skepticism about free will is increasingly often associated with the results of some empirical 
tests – launched by Libet’s trailblazing experiments on the timing of conscious intentions – aiming to 
teach us that our apparently free choices are originated unconsciously. In the present paper, I present 
some theoretical reasons to doubt if the upshots of Libet-like experiments purport to the revolutionary 
consequences they envisage. I will isolate a couple of points I wish to discuss, since they gained much at-
tention in the recent philosophical debate. First, I claim that actually available neuroscientific data do not 
offer a solution to the traditional free will quarrel in compatibilist or incompatibilist terms. Second, one 
might doubt if the kind of free will that is at stake in Libet-like experiments is what really matters for 
grounding our normative concepts. My conclusion will be that what is scrutinised in Libet-like experi-
ments resembles palely the kind of free will we would like to enjoy. 
KEYWORDS: Libet-like Experiments; Efficacy of the Will; Illusionism; Compatibilism / Incompatibilism; 
Control. 
 
█ Riassunto Esperimenti à la Libet ed efficacia della volontà – Lo scetticismo sul libero arbitrio è sempre 
più spesso associato ai risultati di alcuni test empirici – inaugurati dai pionieristici esperimenti di Libet 
sulla tempistica delle intenzioni coscienti – il cui scopo consiste nel mostrare che scelte apparentemente 
libere hanno un’origine inconscia. L’articolo si propone di offrire alcune ragioni teoriche per dubitare che 
i risultati degli esperimenti à la Libet portino alle rivoluzionarie conseguenze che promettono. Discuterò 
di due questioni che hanno ricevuto particolare attenzione nel dibattito filosofico recente. In primo luogo, 
si sosterrà che i dati attualmente disponibili non consentono di formulare una soluzione del tradizionale 
problema del libero arbitrio in termini compatibilisti o incompatibilisti. In secondo luogo, si metterà in 
dubbio che il tipo di scelta libera che è in gioco negli esperimenti à la Libet abbia un ruolo nella costruzio-
ne dei concetti normativi. La conclusione consisterà nella tesi secondo cui l’oggetto di indagine degli espe-
rimenti ispirati da Libet è solo lontanamente simile al tipo di libero arbitrio di cui vorremmo godere. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Esperimenti à la Libet; Efficacia della volontà; Illusionismo; Compatibilismo / Incompa-
tibilismo; Controllo. 
 

 
DURING THE LAST FEW DECADES, skeptical, 
eliminativist, and illusionist arguments have 
gained an increasing share of attention, being 
at center stage in the free will debate. Free will-
related literature is a vast and entangled web: 
some of the more pressing anti-free will objec-
tions appear to be refinements of everlasting 
doubts, while others significantly depend on 
the state of the art in the empirical research. 
Indeed, one who is inclined to defend the idea 
that we are free will-equipped is confronted 
with several philosophical knots belonging to 
Ricerche 
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different domains, including metaphysics, epis-
temology, and empirical sciences broadly con-
strued. These arguments differ both in their 
strategy – some are meant to be philosophi-
cal/a priori,1 while others are empirical/a pos-
teriori2 –, and in the normative/practical con-
sequences they are meant to bring about, which 
range from conservatism to radical eliminativ-
ism. 
However, due to the astonishing results of 
the neuroscientific revolution, skepticism 
about free will is increasingly often associated 
with the results of some well-known empirical 
tests aiming to teach us that our apparently free 
choices are largely made unconsciously. In par-
ticular, a consistent number of studies about 
the functioning of brain mechanisms,3 follow-
ing Benjamin Libet’s trailblazing experiments 
on the timing of conscious intentions,4 have 
been often interpreted in the direction of a 
progressive reduction of the ability of the sub-
ject to exercise a conscious form of control over 
her actions, which would be rather governed by 
unconscious impulses and unintelligent auto-
matic processes.5 Taking it to the extreme, ac-
cording to how the results of some very recent 
experiments have been divulged to the wide 
public, free will might be reducible to some-
thing like background noise in the brain.6 
Recent progresses in the experimental work 
promise to shine a light on the closer-to-the-
factual-truth side of the issue, so that one might 
draw the bold conclusion that philosophy – 
stuck in a never ending debate that did not 
bring us any closer to an answer – should beat a 
retreat. A typical defensive reaction consists in 
making an appeal to the apparent transparency 
of the phenomenology of action in order to 
prove that conscious agency cannot be illusory 
– a move that Libet himself did not disdain.7 
There are, nonetheless, some stronger theoreti-
cal reasons to doubt whether the upshots of 
Libet-like experiments purport to the revolu-
tionary consequences they envisage. In the pre-
sent paper, I will isolate a couple of points I 
wish to discuss, since they gained much atten-
tion in the recent philosophical debate. 
First, less decisive perhaps, actually availa-
ble neuroscientific data do not offer a solution 
to what might be dubbed as the traditional free 
will quarrel, namely providing an answer to the 
free will issue in compatibilist or incompatibilist 
terms.  
In paragraph 2, I will do a bit of rough fram-
ing, before discussing the role of philosophy in 
a field that is now increasingly tackled by em-
pirical sciences. Second, and probably more 
important, one might doubt if – once it is 
granted that one cannot be a «complete insti-
gator»8 of one’s own actions – the kind of free 
will that is at stake in Libet-like experiments is 
what really matters for grounding our norma-
tive concepts.  
The purpose of paragraph 3 – organized in 
a couple of subparagraphs – is to question the 
claim that, when real preferences are in place, 
the experimental results pertaining to the neu-
roscientific enterprise are able to prove the in-
efficacy of the will and of conscious mental 
states, allowing us to draw specific practical and 
normative conclusions. 
It is instead far beyond the scope of the 
present paper to take a stance about the status 
of free will or moral responsibility and to opt 
for an account of them: when all is said and 
done, there could be both good a priori argu-
ments for denying free will as we traditionally 
conceive it, and possible future new empirical 
discoveries leading to reject it. Another point 
that will not be specifically touched concerns 
the practical and normative consequences of 
the hypothetical debunking of our belief in 
free will and – consequently for some – in 
moral responsibility.  
My conclusion is rather that what is scruti-
nised, and ultimately denied, in Libet-like ex-
periments resembles palely the kind of free will 
we would like (or we need) to enjoy. To return 
to the theme with which we began, relegating 
philosophy to the dustbin of history might be 
(for the time being?) a too simplistic move.  
 
█ Libet-like experiments and the traditional 
free will quarrel 
 
The first point I wish to discuss concerns 
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the role of philosophy in the contemporary 
debate about free will. The traditional way to 
frame such philosophical debate consists in 
dividing the battlefield between two main du-
ellists. Setting details aside, on the one hand 
one finds the family of compatibilist theories, 
sharing the thought that the truth of deter-
minism is compatible with the existence of 
some kind of free will and/or the plausibility 
of moral responsibility attributions.  
On the other side, (libertarian) incompati-
bilism contends that only where an indeter-
ministic scenario is given one might act freely 
and responsibly. It is hard to find a univocal 
and satisfactory definition of “determinism” 
in the literature. What seems more similar to a 
standard characterization is that the truth of 
determinism entails that every event is causal-
ly necessitated by the antecedent events, so 
that the conjunction of the facts of the past 
and of the laws of nature makes just one fu-
ture possible at any moment in time.9 
The philosophical dilemma about free 
will consists essentially in an enquiry – taking 
a conditional form (“(even) if determinism / 
indeterminism is true, then…”) – about the 
compatibility between free will and the truth 
of determinism/indeterminism. A compati-
bilist theory’s pars construens usually consists 
in an attempt (“what if…?”) to define how 
one might be free and responsible if deter-
minism obtains. (Libertarian) incompatibil-
ism has the burden to show where and how 
indeterminism must show up in order for one 
to be free and responsible, and in which sense 
one is to be considered free and responsible if 
indeterminism is true.  
Philosophy does not primarily have the 
task of demonstrating the causal structure of 
the world is deterministic or indeterministic, 
which is likely to be a scientific matter (not 
necessarily a neuroscientific one), and then 
to infer from this that we are or we are not 
free will-equipped. 
To put it in other words, theoretical re-
flection has the option to begin with the ac-
ceptance of a factual truth (e.g. determinism 
is true, or the reverse) and then to draw nor-
mative conclusions from it (e.g. if we are not 
free in an indeterministic sense, we cannot be 
morally responsible in a desert-based sense), 
but the scrutiny of the relevant factual truths 
by themselves is beyond the scope and the 
limits of the philosophical enterprise. Then, 
once a certain factual truth is (or seems to 
be) ascertained, there seems to be still a lot to 
do for philosophy. A primary question to ask 
might be, then, if Libet-like experiments give 
a solution to all the theoretical problems just 
sketched. The answer is likely to be negative.  
Let’s take a step back and put some flesh 
on the bones. Libet’s main experiment fea-
tured a number of participants who were re-
quired to spontaneously flex their right wrist 
or the fingers of their right hands whenever 
they felt a wish or an urge to do so. Contem-
porary, participants were asked to watch a 
clock with a dot circling around it, checking 
the time when they decided to flex their wrist 
or their fingers. The electrical readings (EEGs) 
from the scalp indicated the presence of a 
readiness potential (RP) – a phenomenon orig-
inally reported by Hans Helmut Kornhuber 
and Lüder Deecke as Bereitschaftspotential, 
and indicating an activity in the motor cortex 
and in the supplementary motor area of the 
brain10 –, located 550 milliseconds (Type II) 
before the onset of the correspondent action, 
and 350 milliseconds before participants’ 
awareness of having made that decision.  
The onset of the action was measured by 
an electromyogram (EMG), showing muscu-
lar motion to begin. Where the required ac-
tion is pre-planned, the readiness potential 
(Type I) is located even earlier, approximate-
ly 1000 milliseconds before the motor activi-
ty was registered.11 Libet concludes that  
 
free will cannot be viewed as an initiator 
of such a freely voluntary process. We 
clearly found that the initiation of the 
preparation to culminate in a freely vol-
untary movement arises unconsciously in 
the brain, preceding the conscious aware-
ness of wanting or intending to “act now” 
by about 400 msec or more.12  
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Through a number of subsequent experi-
ments, Libet put much effort in the attempt 
to prove the existence of conscious volitional 
control – known as “conscious veto” or “free 
wont’t”13 – as something operating at a later 
level either by «permitting or triggering the 
final motor outcome of the unconsciously in-
itiated process or by vetoing the progression 
to actual motor activation».14  
Needless to say, also the process of vetoing 
might originate unconsciously.15 During the 
last few years, more sophisticated experiments 
conducted with fRMI scanners16 or implanted 
electrodes17 have substantially confirmed 
Libet’s results, in some cases also shockingly 
shifting the beginning of brain activity up to 10 
seconds before the subject’s awareness starts.18 
Critics have often pointed the finger at 
some false steps and misinterpretations of 
the scientific data. However, let’s take for 
granted that Libet-like experiments are able 
to effectively prove that conscious decisions 
are initiated by unconscious activity in the 
brain. The question I wish to address here is 
if what we can learn from these empirical 
tests does help to solve the free will quarrel – 
which originally was, keep it in mind, an is-
sue about the compatibility between our hav-
ing free will and a certain metaphysical sce-
nario –, allowing us to isolate the most plau-
sible view about free will, and to decide be-
tween compatibilism and incompatibilism.  
The results of Libet-like experiments have 
been often interpreted as a good ally for the 
illusionist views on free will and/or moral re-
sponsibility, namely the theses according to 
which free will and/or moral responsibility 
are just subjective illusions.  
It seems worth noting that the greatest 
part of the anti-free will philosophical argu-
ments – from Galen Strawson’s Basic Argu-
ment19 to Derk Pereboom’s Four-stage Argu-
ment20 – appeal to the hypothetical truth of 
determinism or indeterminism, ultimately 
drawing an incompatibilist moral, in order to 
deny the possibility of free will and moral re-
sponsibility or the compatibility between free 
will and determinism/indeterminism. In-
deed, the theoretical basis of such arguments 
consists in the assumption of a given meta-
physical scenario (in which determinism or 
indeterminism obtain), from which some 
skeptical, reductivist, or eliminativist conclu-
sions are gathered. If one wishes to begin 
with neuroscientific data, and then proceeds 
inferring some conceptual truth about free 
will and moral responsibility, the road must 
be different. 
Here, determinism or indeterminism 
cannot be assumed from the start – as anti-
free will a priori arguments usually do –, but 
must be rather inferred from the observation 
of the empirical data. Yet, it is not to be tak-
en for granted which metaphysical interpre-
tation is supported by the available data. In-
deed, it is far from being clear if a choice-
making process characterized merely by the 
absence of a role for conscious will at the on-
set might be counted as a deterministic caus-
al process. In the social-cognitive debate, au-
tomatism as absence of conscious delibera-
tion at the level of mental and behavioural 
processes has been often paired to determin-
ism tout court.21 This might have favoured an 
interpretation of neuroscientific results accord-
ing to which the attack to free will they launch 
is of a deterministic nature. If this is the case, 
the anti-free will thinker would say that we are 
not free will-equipped because our choices are 
determined by some previous factors, which 
seems to be proven by Libet’s results. 
Libertarians deny that it could ultimately 
work, but compatibilism teaches us that 
there is some sense in which we might act 
freely and responsibly even if our actions are 
determined by some previous factors. If this 
is the right interpretation of Libet-inspired 
results, they rather seem to constitute some 
empirical evidence that compatibilism might 
potentially recruit.  
Once acknowledged that our free actions 
are generated by a chain of events that 
stretches backward in time, understanding 
how choice-making processes work in scien-
tific terms does not necessarily threaten the 
belief in the causal efficacy of the will. Where 
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«reduction is just a matter of different ter-
minology»,22 explaining the causal efficacy of 
the will is not necessarily meant to be a syn-
onymous of annihilating it. 
To sum up, given a conception of free will 
that does not require ultimate control – 
namely control over the determinants of our 
own actions –, our actions being determined 
by factors that are beyond our conscious con-
trol might prima facie fit a compatibilist view. 
However, claiming that Libet’s results sup-
port a deterministic view of mental processes 
might turn out to be too precipitous, given 
that the makeup of our neurons is more am-
biguous than our techniques are able to de-
tect. Indeed, what can be inferred from the 
data is not that determinism is true, but 
simply that we can predict some future ac-
tion detecting the unconscious brain activity 
some instants before the decision’s awareness 
is developed. 
As Adina Roskies claims, «predictability 
is at best a poor cousin»23 – and not one of 
the most faithful – of determinism. What 
seems even more remarkable is that neuro-
scientific data are surprisingly compatible al-
so with an indeterministic interpretation of 
mental processes.24 Indeed, the accuracy of 
the predictions in Soon et al.’s experiment is 
around 60%, a result that might be derived 
both from the epistemic limitations of the 
present techniques (the rate goes up to 80%-
90% using implanted electrons detecting in-
dividual neurons instead of fRMI25) and from 
the intrinsic structure of causal relations in 
the physical world.  
So, Libet-like experiments do not offer a 
precise answer to the free will quarrel as it has 
been traditionally posed. Even though they 
might constitute an evidence against the pic-
ture of a free will-equipped agent as a com-
pletely self-originator, they do not allow de-
ciding between compatibilism or incompati-
bilism and they do not offer solutions about 
how normative concepts are to be construed 
and applied, which remain a prerogative of 
theoretical reflection. 
Nonetheless, there is an easy reply that 
the Libet-like anti-free will thinker could of-
fer. The dialectic could go as follows: Libet-
like data might be not sufficiently clear for 
solving the dilemma between determinism 
and indeterminism, thus exhausting all the 
aspects of the traditional quarrel between 
compatibilists and incompatibilists.26 Fair 
enough: philosophy could still play a role in 
defining what conceptions of “moral respon-
sibility”, “punishability”, etc. are compatible 
with our view of the world, or with a natural-
istic picture of the mind. However, this 
might be left to philosophical ruminations 
and anxieties.  
What really matters is that, given that our 
decisions are originated unconsciously, free 
will is just illusory, no matter if the connec-
tion between the early stages of the decision-
al process and the subsequent decision is to 
be understood in deterministic or indeter-
ministic terms. This is a scenario in which 
even a compatibilist might not feel at ease. 
However, if this is the case, a compatibil-
ist/incompatibilist free-will defender could 
still claim that it is the anti-free will thinker 
who shoulders the burden of proof. Indeed, 
without relying on determinism or indeter-
minism, Libet’s skeptic/illusionist sympa-
thizer must prove that our choices are not 
free because they are originated unconscious-
ly. It is a task for the next paragraph to ad-
dress this issue. 
 
█ The role of conscious will 
 
Even though the interpretations of Libet-
inspired experimental data leave us undecid-
ed about the kind of causal connection be-
tween a decision and its unconscious ante-
cedents, it seems that the challenge nowadays 
posed by cognitive neurosciences is located at 
a different, maybe deeper, level, concerning 
the real nature of our choices. Indeed,  
 
a free will process implies one could be 
held consciously responsible for one’s 
choice to act or not to act. We do not hold 
people responsible for actions performed 
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unconsciously, without the possibility of 
conscious control.27 
 
If one is willing to conclude that we are 
not free will-equipped, she must also claim 
that, if our choices have unconscious prepar-
atory antecedents, they are not freely made:  
 
it is a suppressed premise that conscious 
intention must somehow govern free ac-
tion, and if we do not consciously initiate 
or control our actions, they are not freely 
willed.28 
 
Before leaving in the background what we 
dubbed as the free will quarrel, it seems 
worth noting that there is a difference be-
tween neuroscientific-inspired illusionism 
and the traditional debate about determin-
ism. Indeed, deterministic causation by itself 
might not jeopardize our acting freely as long 
as our actions appear to be the natural out-
comes of the mental states we endorse 
and/or we are able to exercise practical rea-
soning of some sort. The specific nature of 
the relationship between mental states and 
physical states/processes might be character-
ized according to (not so) many options: “su-
pervenience, emergence, realization, reduc-
tion”, quoting one of Kim’s contributions on 
the metaphysics of causation.29  
Needless to say, a lot of work is still to be 
done in order to explain how conscious men-
tal events and the physical processes underly-
ing the various phases of choice-making pro-
cesses are related. Since one might easily 
doubt that we could be morally responsible if 
our mental states are not causally relevant, 
the theme of mental causation is likely to be 
the central one in future discussions about 
free will. 
This must be obviously an issue for those 
who do not want to reject a naturalistic pic-
ture of the mind, but neither compatibilism 
nor incompatibilism have usually denied the 
role of conscious mental states in the occur-
rence of the correspondent actions. Since 
conscious mental states – as they have been 
understood by folk intuitions – figure prom-
inently in our moral psychology, dismissing 
them as illusory is likely to have a huge im-
pact, potentially more disruptive than that of 
traditional skeptical worries, on our philo-
sophical beliefs about many moral issues, in-
cluding moral responsibility attributions.  
The question I wish to address is, then, if 
neuroscientific results are sufficient to show 
that we are not free will-equipped because 
our conscious mental states do not carry out 
any causal role in the early stages of the 
choice-making process – whichever specific 
connection between mental and physical 
states one is willing to grant.30 I argue that 
such a conclusion is unwarranted.  
Setting aside methodological and empiri-
cal knots – e.g. lack of accuracy in the time 
estimation,31 individuation of the correlation 
between mental and physical processes32 –, I 
will mostly rely on two conceptual points. 
First, the nature of the relationship that links 
the early stages of the choice-making process, 
the development of the agent’s awareness, 
and the subsequent action appears to be un-
clear. Second, the generalization from the 
kind of decisions made by the participants in 
Libet-like experiments to choices made in 
other contexts might be groundless. These 
points are the subjects of the next two sub-
paragraphs. 
 
█ The nature of choice-making processes 
 
In order to show that a decision is not 
freely made, a supporter of Libet must claim 
that the unconscious beginning of that choice 
is sufficient to make it unfree. The claim con-
tains an implicit characterization of free will 
as consciousness/awareness of choosing to 
make a movement.33 It is generally accepted 
that, for one to act freely, one must be able, at 
a certain time t, to consciously consider the 
reasons from which the action derives. How-
ever, it is not clear if consciousness must be 
located at the very beginning of the process 
ultimately causing a certain action to occur.  
The tendency to support this view is rout-
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ed in the representation of conscious will as 
the causal link between conscious mental 
states and the correspondent action. A typi-
cal move – suggested by Libet himself with 
his vetoing experiment34 – would consist in 
claiming that free will, if it exists, must be lo-
calized at a different level (e.g. the ability to 
rationally assess the different reasons for ac-
tion). This is why many philosophers do not 
engage at all with neuroscientists, claiming 
that the latter do not have a real grasp on the 
concepts that really matter. Furthermore, 
many free will defenders are at ease with a ma-
terialistic conception of the mind, so that it is 
not to be taken for granted that explaining the 
physical processes underlying mental events 
should count against our having free will.  
However, if it is the case that a lack of 
consciousness at an early stage of the choice-
making process undermines the relevant 
kind of control and autonomy we need for be-
ing morally responsible,35 then dismissing 
neuroscientific results as irrelevant might 
turn out to be unwarranted. Indeed, this 
must be a problem also for compatibilist 
thinkers, in particular for those who claim 
that, no matter if determinism is true, we are 
free and/or morally responsible insofar as we 
are significantly in control of our actions 
and/or we are autonomous decision-makers.  
There are no uncontroversial, univocal 
concepts of “control” and “autonomy” to be 
found in the literature. Specifying how one 
might be in control of one’s own action or 
how one satisfies the condition of autonomy 
is a problem that typically lies at the core of 
some of the most attractive contemporary 
theories of free will and moral responsibility. 
Even just considering the compatibilist field, 
these basic ideas can be cashed out in many 
different ways. John Martin Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza have contended that one 
might be morally responsible for one’s own 
action if one possesses what they dub as 
“guidance control”. One possesses moral re-
sponsibility-relevant guidance control if one 
is the owner of the mechanism of choice 
from which the action flows, and if one is 
able to respond appropriately to (at least) 
some reasons for action.36 Alfred Mele claims 
that the “psychological autonomy” relevant 
for moral responsibility is guaranteed if the 
following three (sufficient) compatibilist 
conditions are jointly satisfied: 
 
(1) The agent has no compelled motiva-
tional states, nor any coercively produced 
motivational states; (2) The agent’s be-
liefs are conducive to informed delibera-
tion about all matters that concern him; 
(3) The agent is a reliable deliberator.37  
 
One might argue that – if neuroscientific 
results prove to be able to show that we lack 
relevant kind of control on our actions – at 
least control-based accounts of moral re-
sponsibility could be undermined. However, 
this seems to be contentious for a number of 
reasons. The crucial point is that being suffi-
ciently in control of my future action does 
not necessarily coincide with my being in 
control of all the factors that causally con-
tribute to the occurrence of that action. 
Hence, one way to proceed consists in asking 
if what is absent in Libet-like scenarios is the 
kind of control relevant for moral responsi-
bility.  
Trying to dismiss the belief that neurosci-
entific results succeed in undermining the role 
of conscious will in the production of one’s 
actions, Mele invites Libet’s supporters to 
carefully distinguish between activities such as 
intending, deciding or being in a certain moti-
vational state, like a desire or an urge.38 
The relationship between those motives 
and being in a subjective state of awareness is 
much more complex than it is usually exem-
plified in the interpretation of neuroscientific 
data. In particular, it is not clear if – for an 
action to be free –, consciousness as “aware-
ness of one’s own intentions or urges”39 must 
figure among the factors that causally con-
tribute to the occurrence of the very same ac-
tion. This seems to be relevant since, in 
Libet-like experiments, the (time of) subjects’ 
awareness plays a decisive role. Indeed, the 
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conclusion of the experiments is that the pa-
tient is not freely deciding because she is too 
lately aware of having a desire/urge to do a 
certain action.  
First, it is questionable if every free-willed 
action is the product of a desire we are aware 
of. Needless to say, we perform many actions 
we did not give a conscious assent to. Just for 
typing a single meaningful sentence on my 
keyboard (consider “All work and no play 
makes Jack a dull boy”), I have to quickly 
press a number of letters, which ultimately 
form single words and a whole sentence. If I 
voluntary type the sentence on my keyboard, 
my desire to write every single letter of the 
sentence “All work and no play makes Jack a 
dull boy” is to be included in the list of the 
causes of my typing the correspondent letters 
on my keyboard. However, it is not so clear if 
my awareness of my desire of wanting – what 
Roskies calls a «meta-state, consciousness of 
conscious intent»40 – to type the sentence 
plays any causal role in the occurrence of the 
correspondent action. 
In other words – granted that the de-
sire/urge to raise the right wrist at a time t 
must have an identifiable causal role in the 
production of the subsequent action –, it is 
not clear which is the causal role that this 
kind of awareness must accomplish in order 
for the subsequent action to be freely made. 
Consider also actions that are performed 
routinely – such as moving our legs in a cer-
tain way to walk without loosing balance –, 
where a conscious decisional process is not 
always involved, but the action appears to be 
still freely performed.41 Sometimes we also do 
things that happen so instantaneously that 
we do not have the time to be involved in a 
proper choice-making process we can be 
aware of. 
We could sum up by saying that, similarly 
to what confabulation theorists often con-
tend,42 introspection is not such a trustwor-
thy guide for what is happening inside the 
box. Obviously, awareness – as self-reflection 
– of my own intentions might play a causal 
role insofar as my being aware of my own de-
sires modifies my future conduct. For exam-
ple, my being aware of having an excessive 
craving for chocolate might be among the 
causal factors that push me to avoid walking 
too close to pastry shops. Indeed, awareness 
as self-reflection plays a relevant role in many 
popular theories of moral responsibility. 
Though maybe absent in the early phases of a 
decisional process, it is obviously part of 
what grounds morally responsible actions: in 
a case in which one lacks the ability for self-
reflection, agency itself appears to be imper-
illed. However, this is different from claim-
ing that the awareness of an urge must be 
among the causes of any action we freely per-
form. What is more is that, in the ordinary us-
age of the term, awareness of an intention is 
something that follows and not something 
that precedes the intention formation:43 I wish 
to write the sentence “All work and no play 
makes Jack a dull boy” on my keyboard and 
then I am a posteriori aware of my wish. It is 
not clear how the reverse might be possible.  
Nonetheless, there is a stronger way to 
put the issue, which might be not so easy to 
dismiss. Saying that consciousness of a deci-
sion, where reduced to a biochemical after-
thought, does not play a role in the produc-
tion of the subsequent action might signify 
that conscious will and conscious mental 
states are just bypassed by unconscious stimu-
li, something that determinism does not nec-
essarily imply by itself.44 If this is the case, the 
agent may be assimilated to a “spectator” of 
what is happening to her own mental life. 
Following this line, psychologist Daniel 
Wegner has questioned if intentions might 
be located among the causes of the corre-
spondent conscious actions. If a thought is 
not the causal antecedent of the correspond-
ent movement (and it is not consistent with 
the correspondent movement), free will and 
also voluntary agency turn out to be illuso-
ry.45 No matter my subjective perception of 
voluntariness, there is no voluntary action at 
all. One might object that this picture of 
one’s mental life heavily depends on a hack-
neyed representation of the relationship be-
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tween mind and body,46 where free will is to 
be seen as a force generating a movement.  
Nonetheless, if one proves able to demon-
strate that unconscious RP is all that is re-
quired for a certain outcome to occur, free 
will thinkers are likely to have a hard time. 
Luckily for them, this is not a given truth.47 
Elisabeth Pacherie has argued that even sim-
ple decision-making scenarios, like the ones 
characterizing Libet’s experiments, are multi-
step processes, involving different conscious 
mental activities that should coordinate for 
the relevant action to occur.48 Mele stresses 
how the conscious feeling of having an 
urge/desire to move is among the causes that 
produce the subsequent outcome, since the 
subjects involved in the experiments are re-
quired to wait until they experience an urge 
to flex and then to flex their wrist in response 
to the correspondent feeling.49 
At this point, a Libet supporter might re-
ply that, even though the initial trigger is not 
all there is, still the unconscious origin of 
one’s decision is something that undermines 
free will as we conceive it. I will try to say 
something about this issue in the next sub-
paragraph. 
 
█ Neuroscientific data and real decisions 
 
In Libet’s experiments, participants are 
asked to flex their wrist at the time of their 
choosing. They are instructed to spontane-
ously give an answer to an urge they are re-
quired to experience. In Soon et al.’s more 
recent version of the experiment, partici-
pants are asked to complete a slightly more 
complex task. Whenever they feel the urge to 
do so, they have to choose between two dif-
ferent buttons, each of them operated by 
their left or right index fingers, and then to 
press the one they choose immediately after 
deciding. There is some sense in which, obvi-
ously, the participants are making a free 
choice. Ironically, a typical way to illustrate 
what our being free will-equipped implies 
consists in asking the interlocutors to raise 
one of their hands or fingers at their wish, and 
then in suggesting that one is able to freely de-
cide what to do. However, it might be possible 
that the choice the participants are required to 
make in Libet-like scenarios do not shed (so 
much) light on the free will problem. Here, 
two basic points seem to be relevant. 
First, the kind of choices that are tested in 
Libet-like experiments are guided solely by 
proximal intentions, involving what the agent 
decides to do immediately after being settled 
about a particular course of action. The free 
will defender may claim that it is doubtful if 
the same model could be applied to distal in-
tentions and planned actions – whose con-
nection with short-term intentions is still to 
be explored –, where rational reflection has 
much weight, or where the decision-maker is 
not previously instructed to make a definite 
decision at a time. This is a case of what Mi-
chael Bratman defines as future-directed in-
tentions, representing a distinguishing ele-
ment of our acting over time.50 With long-
term affairs, once I am settled about a certain 
future plan (goal intention), I form implemen-
tation intentions51 regarding when, where, 
and how I will perform the correspondent 
action. For example, if in January I start 
thinking that it would be an amazing idea to 
spend the summer at the Overlook Hotel, 
and I suddenly proceed to the evaluation of 
several pros and cons, it is hard to see how 
conscious mental states (or the mental states 
I am aware of) might be excluded from the 
set of causes leading to my final decision. 
Obviously, my mental states being rele-
vant is not enough for saving free will and 
moral responsibility as we traditionally con-
ceive them. If it is the case that my final deci-
sion turns out to be the result of a purely de-
terministic process – so that, for example, I 
could not have had mental states different 
from those that I had –, one might still plau-
sibly contend that my choice was not freely 
made or that I am not accountable for choos-
ing such a dangerous location for my exciting 
summer. But, without invoking determinism 
from the start and granted that neuroscien-
tific data are reliable, the only proven thing is 
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that I started being aware of some very basic 
factors contributing to my final choice after 
they started playing a role in the production 
of the subsequent action. 
A reductivist, claiming that all mental 
events are reducible to physical states, might 
still draw the conclusion that, since all the 
events are ultimately physical, there is no 
room for free will as we traditionally think of 
it. However, as mentioned before, the truth 
of reductivism does not seem to be clearly 
entailed by neuroscientific results.52 The one 
just made is a point about the temporal link 
between the development of a certain set of 
intentions/desires/urges and the occurrence 
of the correspondent action.  
A second point, concerning the nature of 
the decisions made in Libet-like experiments, 
is related to their contents. As many have no-
ticed, in Libet-like experiments, participants 
are required to give their assent to something 
for which they do not have a real prefer-
ence.53 They may have to decide between 
pressing the right or the left button, knowing 
that no relevant consequences will derive from 
their choice. Consider, instead, if they were 
required to decide between the right and the 
left button, both having some relevant conse-
quences. For example, they know that, press-
ing the right button, they cause a fat man to 
fall from the train saving the group of people 
on the track while, pressing the left button, 
they will protect the fat man and sacrifice the 
group of people on the track. Given that they 
are allowed to take their time to decide (no 
rush in this version of the trolley problem!), 
they would probably decide to take into ac-
count different relevant factors, including, 
probably, their ethical considerations and 
preferences, or the particular reasons that are 
in place in the context of choice. 
Again, if the scenario is deterministic, one 
might contend that the participants will ulti-
mately decide what they are deterministically 
caused to decide, so that they cannot be held 
fairly accountable for their choice of sacrific-
ing/saving the fat man. However, in the ab-
sence of a deterministic premise, saying that 
the initial trigger of such a complex decision 
was unconscious seems to be a too tiny basis 
for undermining the belief that the choice, 
whichever it is, is made freely and responsibly.  
It remains still possible that Libet-like ex-
periments prove able to show that the so-
called liberty of indifference (consider the 
paradox of Buridan’s ass) is just illusory, be-
cause it turns out to be false that we just con-
sciously freely decide what to do when no ef-
fective preferences are implied. When one is 
rationally undecided between two or more 
options, it might be possible that uncon-
scious factors play a leading role. There are, 
nonetheless, other cases in which one might 
have the impression of “just deciding”, with-
out giving her rational assent to any of the 
options. For example, it might be the case 
that neuroscientific data have something to 
say about what Mark Balaguer dubs as “torn 
decisions”. A torn decision is a decision in 
which the agent  
 
(a) has reasons for two or more options 
and feels torn as to which set of reasons is 
stronger, that is, has no conscious belief as 
to which option is best, given her reasons; 
and that (b) decides without resolving the 
conflict – that is, the person has the expe-
rience of “just choosing”.54 
 
The example made by Balaguer is that of a 
man, Ralph, who is deliberating between two 
long-life decisions (a tranquil existence in 
Mayberry vs. an eventful life in New York), 
both of which having many pros and cons. Ba-
laguer contends that, once Ralph ultimately 
gives his assent to one of the options (e.g. go-
ing to New York), this is not because he un-
derstood that the one he chose outweighs the 
other, but simply because «he just decided to 
go».55 In Balaguer’s libertarian event-causal 
view, adequately non-random torn decisions 
are the sign of our having free will. 
Here, a Libet supporter may object that, 
in a case in which one set of reasons does not 
clearly outweigh the other, and one gets the 
impression of “just deciding”, the decision is 
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simply determined by unconscious anteced-
ents. Then, it seems that even big or long-life 
decisions – when there are, indeed, relevant 
differences between two opposing options –, 
might be ultimately produced by unconscious 
antecedents. One way to reply might be this: 
in a case in which there are relevant differ-
ences between rival options, the simple fact 
that one gets the impression that she has no 
preferences between the two does not prove 
that one does not have any effective (namely, 
able to affect the choice) preference between 
the two. For example, one might say that 
Ralph ultimately decides to go to New York 
because he is the kind of man that, at that 
time in his life, would prefer to follow his ca-
reer ambitions in New York rather than to 
live a tranquil life in Mayberry, even though 
he does not consciously recognize which set 
of reasons is stronger. 
It is plausible to admit that big decisions 
in life are strongly oriented by not fully ra-
tionalized motives (e.g. the kind of persons 
we are), or by more contingent factors that 
are not completely acknowledged (e.g. our 
present mood), but this is not a proof that 
these choices are made unconsciously as long 
as part of the choice-making process consists 
in rationally assessing the different reasons 
we have. In other words, it is possible that 
the motives we have orient us far beyond our 
conscious ability to understand their effect 
over our subsequent conduct: one might be 
acting freely also if she is not totally aware of 
the weight the single motives have on the 
balance of her own mental life. If Ralph con-
sciously realizes the unlikelihood of him ful-
filling his dreams as a football player in New 
York, this simple realization would probably 
have relevant consequences on his subse-
quent choices.  
To sum up, recognizing that our choices 
are partially made unconsciously does not 
bring us, by itself (e.g. in the absence of a de-
terministic scenario), to conclude that they 
are made unfreely.56  
Nonetheless, there might be some side ef-
fects we have not considered yet. 
█ Conclusion: Striving for balance 
 
In the previous paragraph, we tended to 
dismiss the claim that self-awareness is a reli-
able guide for identifying freely chosen 
courses of action. There are many ways to 
undermine the relationship between self-
awareness and agency. One might appeal to 
the naiveté of folk psychology or, as we al-
ready did, to the Spinozian theme of the 
opacity of introspection,57 to sustain that we 
are likely to be (systematically?) mistaken 
about the sources of our mental states, and 
that we tend to produce ex post explanations 
of our choices on the basis of the environ-
ment. On a similar vein, social psychologists 
have stressed that many alleged fully self-
directed acts are determined or strongly ori-
ented by apparently extraneous factors, im-
plicit prejudices, or psychological biases we 
are not aware of – and that we would proba-
bly reject as motivating causes of our con-
scious behaviour.58 
Progressively subtracting a role to self-
awareness might boomerang on some of the 
most promising theories of agency and moral 
responsibility, which are deeply grounded on 
the subject’s ability to implement the mental 
states she identifies with and she is aware of – 
well-known examples are the theories of agen-
cy and responsibility provided by Harry 
Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Michael Brat-
man.59 In particular – a point that is made by 
John Doris60 –, if the ability to implement 
one’s own set of mental states is part of what 
makes us morally responsible, then the 
acknowledgement of our impoverished self-
awareness might play a significant role in un-
dermining our trust in strong accountability 
and in full-fledged agency. It might be the case 
that, for any single instance of agency, an ex-
planation that does not make any reference to 
self-direction is the right one. Once this possi-
bility is granted, skepticism inevitably looms. 
Generally speaking, the empirical lines of 
evidence sketched in the present paper tend 
to increase the level of our skepticism, lead-
ing us to entertain the plausible belief that 
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complete authorship and self-direction are to 
be considered the illusory results of an inflat-
ed and unrealistic conception of agency. It 
might be even possible that, in the future, 
neuroscientific data will allow the falsifica-
tion of the deterministic or indeterministic 
hypothesis about how our brain mechanisms 
work. However, it remains questionable if 
this result might be grounded in the neuro-
scientific data we actually have. 
Even conceding that neuroscientific data 
are not referred only to very simple desires 
and urges, they may cast some light exclu-
sively on the embryonic stages of choice-
making processes. It seems hard to warrant 
the conclusion that the identification and 
subsequent implementation of one’s mental 
states cannot be a good basis for a theory of 
free will and moral responsibility. However – 
if the connection between brain events and 
conscious behaviour is to be understood as 
something like a causal relationship –, noth-
ing excludes that, in the next few years, much 
more complex studies will be able to map the 
physical processes underlying conscious in-
tentions and subsequent actions. For exam-
ple, as suggested by Roskies, some recent ex-
perimental work on the neural basis of deci-
sion-making in Rhesus macaques61 is likely to 
better elucidate which processes in the nerv-
ous system represent propositional content: 
  
Once we can conceive of the neural repre-
sentation of abstract propositions, it is 
but a small step to think of them as repre-
senting reasons or considerations for ac-
tion, and their relative firing rates as re-
flecting the weight given to reasons for 
decision or action.62 
 
If also human decision-making is to be 
thought in these terms, we might question 
popular theories of free will and moral re-
sponsibility relying on our ability to assess 
different reasons for action. Quoting Neil 
Levy, it is even possible that the philosophers 
who criticize Libet and Wegner «have won 
this battle», but «will lose the war: con-
sciousness does not, in fact, play the kind of 
role in action that Libet and Wegner believe 
to be required in order for us to be morally 
responsible».63  
For now, a full understanding of how 
choice-making processes work remains an 
elusive task – and a task that requires a scien-
tific, and not merely a philosophical, ap-
proach. To conclude, my inclination is to 
agree with those that have argued that the 
Libet-like line of research easily goes wrong if 
it claims to have already given an answer to 
the core philosophical problems concerning 
how free will, moral responsibility and agen-
cy must be unfolded. Needless to say, a quick 
dismissal is also to be considered undesirable. 
To emphasize the belief that free will is not 
something that could be simply discovered or 
revealed is compatible with the idea that we 
will especially owe to experimental data if, in 
the next future, we are likely to know more 
and more about the mechanisms that regu-
late our decision-making processes. 
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